Buryatia, August 2025: Increased legal persecution masks a deepening social crisis

Petr Dondukov

August 2025

Summary

In August 2025, the Republic of Buryatia witnessed an intensification of repression amid a systemic socioeconomic crisis. Authorities expanded prosecutions for anti-war statements to include private conversations in prisons and continued to persecute activists abroad. An official prosecutor’s report acknowledged the critical state of the region’s infrastructure, while the war in Ukraine continues to have a disproportionate impact on the republic, which ranks second in military casualties per capita.

1. Context and methodology

The report is based on an analysis of open sources for August–September 2025. It includes data from international and Russian human rights organizations, official government publications, legislative analysis, and monitoring of independent media and social media.

2. Key performance indicators

In August 2025, only two cases of human rights violations resulting in administrative fines were officially recorded in Buryatia. The low number of official cases does not reflect the true scale of the violations, indicating a climate of fear and self-censorship in the region.

3. Political repression and freedom of expression

Domestic persecution

On August 27, 2025, inmate Sergei Chistyakov was fined 30,000 rubles in сorrectional сolony No. 8 for “discrediting the army” in a private conversation with his cellmates. The case was based solely on the testimony of three inmates, and the hearing was held via video link without mention of a lawyer. This precedent demonstrates the extension of censorship to private conversations in closed institutions.

Over the course of the month, there were instances of information being blocked (a website selling sanctioned cheeses in Severobaikalsk), fines for publishing “extremist” symbols, and insults in chat rooms. On August 8, Roskomnadzor conducted an inspection of regional media outlets and subsequently opened a case against the editor.

Cross-border repression

On August 22, 2025, ethnographer and activist Radzhana Dugarova was designated a “foreign agent.” This designation was supplemented by a criminal case (initiated in March) and a wanted list (in September), effectively blocking her activities even abroad.

In July 2025, journalist Yevgeniya Baltatarova was sentenced in absentia to seven years in prison and blogger Ayan Bayande to six years for “fakes about russian army” and “justifying terrorism.” Journalist Anna Zueva was placed on the wanted list. These cases confirm that emigration does not guarantee protection from persecution.

4. Civil activism and environmental protests

On August 19, 2025, residents of the villages of Oshurkovo and Sotnikovo held a protest against the planned apatite mining, fearing the destruction of Lake Baikal’s ecosystem. Although no immediate arrests followed, protesters received threats of “work problems,” illustrating the chilling effect potential repression can have on civic engagement.

5. Rights of indigenous peoples

State policy toward indigenous peoples is characterized by duality: support for cultural initiatives (awards, competitions, participation in forums) is combined with harsh repression against political activists. The Free Buryatia Foundation has been designated an undesirable organization, and a regional headquarters for combating “separatism” has been established, indicating violation of self-government and self-determination rights of peoples.

6. Military service and its consequences

The Republic of Buryatia continues to suffer disproportionately high losses in the war with Ukraine, ranking second in confirmed casualties per capita (as of March 2025). To bolster recruitment, Ulan-Ude authorities are proposing a one-time payment of 1,000,000 rubles for contract service—a sum particularly significant for a low-income region, effectively exploiting the population’s economic hardship.

7. Socio-economic crisis

The Buryatia Prosecutor’s Office’s report for the first half of 2025 officially acknowledged the region’s systemic problems:

Healthcare: low access to primary care, deteriorating equipment, critical staffing shortages

Infrastructure: critical condition of schools and housing, deteriorating utility networks

Social Services: widespread violations of the rights of disabled people and orphans to housing and social services

The official findings are supported by numerous utility accidents and service outages in Ulan-Ude throughout August.

8. Conditions of detention

The decree of August 22, 2025, acknowledged the problem of pretrial detention center overcrowding in several Russian regions, which could also affect Buryatia. In September, it was reported that Crimean political prisoner Oksana Senezhuk had been transferred to women’s colony No. 7 in Ulan-Ude, despite her request to be kept closer to her elderly mother, a move that violates the principle of maintaining family ties.

9. Electoral environment

In the run-up to the September 14, 2025 elections, multiple violations were recorded: refusals to register candidates and the exclusion of the LDPR leadership from party lists.

10. Violations of digital rights and increased censorship

At the federal level, a law has been passed permanently blocking websites for repeated publication of “fakes” about military operations.

11. Legal analysis

Russian legislation is increasingly being used to legitimize human rights violations. Laws on “foreign agents,” “undesirable organizations,” and articles of the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offenses on “fakes” and “discrediting” the army create a legal basis for systematic repression that violates constitutional guarantees and Russia’s international obligations.

12. Forecast for Q4 2025

The dynamics of recent months point to a further intensification of repression. With the launch of a regional headquarters to combat separatism and new laws blocking websites, the following is expected:

  • An increase in the number of criminal cases under articles of extremism and terrorism
  • Increased persecution of emigrants through sentencing in absentia
  • Expanded application of repressive legislation to new categories of citizens
  • Continued use of the judicial system as an instrument of state policy

13. Recommendations

To the Federal Authorities of the Russian Federation

Immediately repeal or significantly amend repressive legislation that excessively restricts fundamental freedoms
Stop persecuting citizens for expressing opinions about military actions
Ensure the independence of the judiciary

To the regional authorities of Buryatia

Develop a transparent plan with specific indicators for addressing social problems identified by the prosecutor’s office
Stop persecuting environmental activists and ensure genuine citizen participation in environmental decision-making
Direct resources toward addressing infrastructure issues instead of funding the repressive apparatus

To international organizations

Expand support programs for Russian emigrants, including expediting relocation procedures and providing legal assistance
Strengthen monitoring of the situation in closed institutions in Russia
Use official reports from Russian agencies to pressure the authorities to fulfill their obligations

14. Data sources

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