THE CASE OF IRAKLI CHIKHLADZE: A BLOW TO FREEDOM AND REPUTATION
Hava Beshtoeva
We ask you to pay attention to the criminal prosecution of journalist Irakli Chikhladze. He is currently held in custody in Penitentiary Establishment No. 8 (the so-called Gldani Prison), despite the fact that investigators refuse to make public the case materials that could in any way indicate Chikhladze’s alleged guilt. The case is classified in its entirety, and the defendant is forbidden from seeing his family, making phone calls, or even exchanging letters.
On 30 May 2026, officers of the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) entered Chikhladze’s flat, conducted a search, and seized his phone and personal computers. On the same day, an official spokesperson for the SSSG announced at a special press briefing that citizen Irakli Chikhladze had been arrested on charges of espionage. Specifically, the statement indicated that Chikhladze had allegedly passed information of various categories to third parties, which included data “of interest to special services, concerning ongoing political and economic processes in Georgia and the region, including neighbouring countries, as well as the situation in law enforcement agencies and security structures.” At the same time, the defendant’s defence barrister, Giorgi Gelkhauri, states that there is no mention in the case materials of state secrets, to which Chikhladze had no access. This provides grounds to believe that certain “data” reported by the SSSG may in fact be publicly available information, the collection and publication of which constitutes routine journalistic work.
https://ssg.gov.ge/en/news/1118/sus-ma-jashushobis-braldebit-saqartvelos-erti-moqalaqe-daakava
In an interview with the Georgian TV company Formula, Chikhladze’s defence barrister stated that he does not have the right to disclose details of the investigation. However, he noted that the case materials presented to him contain no evidence of espionage itself. According to the barrister, the prosecution claims there is a video recording showing an unidentified individual allegedly handing money to Chikhladze. At the same time, the prosecution does not specify who this person is, what money is involved, or for what purpose it was allegedly given to the accused.
On 9 September, the first court hearing to consider the merits of the case will take place. We ask human rights organisations to pay attention to this case, as we believe it requires international monitoring. The accused, Chikhladze, demands that the case be declassified and made public, given that a closed trial creates grounds for innuendo and speculation, and complicates matters for the defence.
The Activities of Irakli Chikhladze. Irakli Chikhladze is the founder and editor-in-chief of the analytical portal New Caucasus, a position he has held continuously since 2007. The publication specialises in in-depth expert analysis of political, social, and economic developments in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Over the years of its operation, major Western foundations and organisations, such as USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), have acted as partners to the publication.
An important part of his work was dedicated to conflict resolution and overcoming stereotypes. Chikhladze organised meetings and joint projects for Georgian, Abkhazian, and Ossetian journalists. For instance, events were held under his auspices in Yerevan, bringing together reporters from conflict zones to launch joint cross-border media initiatives.
Furthermore, Irakli Chikhladze served as the head of the Caucasus Centre for Civil Hearings, an organisation registered in Tbilisi. The platform is widely known for hosting public discussions on the region’s most pressing issues. In particular, the centre organised field visits and debates in Gori to discuss the situation in Georgian villages situated directly along the occupation line with South Ossetia. The Caucasus Institute for Human Rights is another non-governmental organisation founded by Irakli Chikhladze, which engages in monitoring compliance with civil liberties across the Caucasus.
As part of the activities of his non-governmental organisations, primarily the Caucasus Centre for Civil Hearings, Irakli Chikhladze regularly organised round tables, debates, and public panel discussions. Their primary objective was to reduce regional tensions and foster dialogue. These meetings were aimed at overcoming stereotypes and seeking pathways to resolve ethnopolitical conflicts in the South Caucasus. Experts, human rights advocates, and journalists from opposing sides were invited to participate in these events.
Thus, Irakli Chikhladze served as a key organiser of meetings in Yerevan in 2015 and subsequently on neutral territory in Armenia, bringing together journalists from conflict zones. For the first time in a long while, Georgian, Abkhazian, and Ossetian reporters gathered at the same table. Participants discussed professional standards, information warfare, and opportunities for launching joint media initiatives aimed at reducing levels of hostility in the press.
He also conducted regional civil hearings near the occupation line. These field events were carried out directly in the regions of Georgia to draw attention to the humanitarian issues faced by the local population. For example, in 2015, a round table in Gori was dedicated to the situation in Georgian villages situated directly along the administrative boundary line (the occupation line) with South Ossetia. The meeting addressed the safety of local residents, the problems associated with “borderisation” (the installation of barbed wire by the Russian military), and the infringement of citizens’ rights to freedom of movement.
A number of discussions organised by Chikhladze also addressed the monitoring of human rights compliance, the protection of ethnic minorities in border regions, and access to independent media space.
Against the backdrop of Irakli Chikhladze’s arrest in May 2026, the investigation is attempting to portray the organisation of such cross-border round tables and meetings as a “cover for coordinating an intelligence network”, whereas colleagues and participants stress the strictly human rights-orientated and professional nature of these events.
In some initial Russian media reports following his detention, Chikhladze was erroneously linked to the pro-Russian media union “Eurasia”. However, independent Georgian sources and the journalist’s colleagues refute this, emphasizing that Chikhladze has always worked exclusively within the framework of the pro-Western non-governmental sector and independent journalism.
https://jam-news.net/ru/аресты-за-шпионаж-в-грузии-чихладзе-рц/
The Issue of Funding in Light of Pressure on Foreign Donors
It is noteworthy that Irakli Chikhladze’s projects and organisations in the South Caucasus received financial and grant support from major Western governmental foundations, European institutions, and international human rights networks. Funding was allocated for the development of independent media, human rights monitoring, and the facilitation of intercultural dialogue.
Irakli Chikhladze collaborated with USAID (the United States Agency for International Development), the primary donor for the majority of independent media in the region. The agency provided grants for the technical development of the New Caucasus portal, the training of journalists in regional standards, and the maintenance of a correspondent network.
Furthermore, Chikhladze’s projects received support from the NED (National Endowment for Democracy), an American organisation that funded analytical materials dedicated to human rights, freedom of speech, and the monitoring of electoral processes in the South Caucasus.
Additionally, through special small-grant programmes, the US Diplomatic Mission in Georgia supported individual civil hearings and discussion panels organised by the Caucasus Centre for Civil Hearings.
The European Endowment for Democracy (EED) — an EU organisation directly supporting journalists and civil activists in Eastern Partnership countries — assisted Chikhladze’s cross-border projects, under which authors from Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan collaborated.
The British Embassy in Georgia, through the Good Governance Fund, provided funding for programmes supporting his round tables, particularly in Gori, where the issues facing the population living along the administrative boundary line with South Ossetia were discussed.
The Heinrich Böll Foundation (Germany), a political foundation closely affiliated with the Green Party, actively supported the Caucasus Centre for Civil Hearings in conducting public debates on issues regarding ecology, gender equality, and overcoming the consequences of ethnopolitical conflicts.
The Government of the Netherlands, under the MATRA programme — which focuses on projects aimed at societal transformation and the protection of human rights — also acted as a partner to the Caucasus Institute for Human Rights.
International human rights and peacebuilding networks, such as International Alert and Saferworld — reputable international non-governmental organisations headquartered in London that specialise in conflict prevention — served as co-organisers and financial donors for meetings between Georgian, Abkhazian, and Ossetian journalists, which were moderated by Chikhladze at neutral venues (for example, in Yerevan).
As of 2026, the status of international Western foundations (such as USAID, the NED, the EED, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, and others) in Georgia has become critical. A large-scale state campaign has been launched against them, and their activities in the country have been legally paralyzed and criminalised. In our view, the arrest of Irakli Chikhladze is directly connected to this situation.
In 2025–2026, Western foundations faced a consistent tightening of legislation by the ruling Georgian Dream party. Following the initial 2024 law “on transparency”, the authorities adopted an even harsher version of the law on the registration of foreign agents. Direct criminal liability has now been introduced for refusing to register as an organisation “carrying out the interests of a foreign power”. In March 2026, the Parliament of Georgia passed radical amendments to the Law on Grants, according to which any foreign grant must receive prior government approval. The receipt of unapproved funds is punishable by enormous fines, the freezing of bank accounts, and prison sentences. A criminal offence covering “political activism” has been introduced, prescribing criminal penalties (up to 12 years’ imprisonment) for activities related to “political matters” if financed from abroad. Virtually all independent journalism and human rights work fall under this vague definition.
This occurs against the backdrop of direct accusations regarding the preparation of a revolution. The Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Kobakhidze, and leaders of the ruling party openly accuse American and European foundations of subversive activity. Official statements claim that USAID, the NED, and the EED are funding “wealthy NGOs” in order to organise a coup d’état and a revolution in Georgia, which, according to the authorities, threatens the country’s sovereignty.
The current situation of specific donors, such as USAID (US), is under extreme pressure in Georgia. The situation has been exacerbated by the fact that the US administration, as part of its “Trade over Aid” policy, began reducing traditional grant programmes worldwide, thereby weakening the protective cover for local NGOs. In Georgia, the agency’s offices are effectively stripped of the ability to legally fund the civil sector. NED (US) and EED (European Union) have effectively been declared by the authorities to be the “vanguard of revolutionary attempts”. Their allocation of grants to Georgian media, including Irakli Chikhladze’s projects, is now viewed by the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) not as international cooperation, but as an element of “hostile foreign influence” and espionage. German and European foundations (the Heinrich Böll Foundation and others) have almost entirely wound down their public discussion programmes and regional round tables. Local organisations that accepted funding from them are closing down en masse, liquidating, or attempting to relocate their operations outside Georgia to avoid the freezing of accounts and the criminal prosecution of their staff. The case of Irakli Chikhladze and other media figures in the spring and summer of 2026 became a direct consequence of this policy, as the official receipt of funds from these foundations is now de facto equated by the state with working for foreign intelligence services.
Legal Paradox.
The lack of official access to state secrets objectively appears to be the main legal paradox in the case of Irakli Chikhladze; however, the specifics of Georgian legislation and the working methods of the security services allow for such a charge to be brought.
Formally, Irakli Chikhladze did not require security clearance to state secrets to fall under the espionage article, for the reason that the charge is built on Article 314 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (“Espionage”). The text of this article is phrased extremely broadly and consists of two parts, one of which penalises the “collection or transfer of other information on the instructions of a foreign intelligence service to the detriment of Georgia’s interests”.
https://matsne.gov.ge/ru/document/view/16426?publication=296
Under the definition of “other information”, absolutely any open, public, or analytical information can legally fall. From the perspective of the investigation, the crime is not the fact of possessing secrets itself, but the execution of a task assigned by a foreign intelligence service. Even if a journalist collects open data (for example, sentiments within power structures, economic indicators, or analysis of political elites), but does so, as the SSSG claims, in coordination with foreign intelligence, the law interprets this as espionage.
Defence lawyer Giorgi Gelkhauri formally stated that the investigation failed to answer the question of what specific secret information the journalist transmitted and what precise damage was caused to the country.
Prominent Georgian legal experts, in particular constitutional scholars Vakhtang Khmaladze and Lasha Tugushi, attempted to challenge Article 314 in the Constitutional Court many years ago. They argued that due to the vague wording regarding “other information”, the authorities could use this article as a repressive tool against any independent journalist or analyst, forcing society to believe in the existence of “internal enemies”.
https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/190262
Thus, to arrest the journalist, it proved sufficient for the state to claim that his analytical projects and round tables were funded by Western foundations not for the sake of civil dialogue, but as part of an “intelligence assignment”.
The application of Article 314 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (“Espionage”) against media representatives has a long and painful history in the country. The main feature of these cases is their complete confidentiality (classified “secret”), vague wording, and the use of arrests as a tool in a major geopolitical game.
The case of Irakli Chikhladze is an example of how professional journalism can be criminalised by the authorities. However, Irakli Chikhladze’s case is not an isolated incident, but part of a new and most extensive counterintelligence operation by the SSSG of Georgia in recent years. In the spring and summer of 2026, several individuals with entirely different backgrounds were arrested under Article 314 (“Espionage”) at once: Irakli Chikhladze, the pro-Western editor-in-chief of an analytical portal; Gulbaat Rtskhiladze, a prominent pro-Russian activist and political analyst, head of the “Eurasia Institute”, who was accused of spying for Russia; as well as Giorgi Udzilauri, a former high-ranking PR professional and ex-official, who is also implicated in the “European vector” of the case.
According to a number of analysts, in 2026, the ruling Georgian Dream party has been using Article 314 to demonstrate a “multi-vector struggle”. By simultaneously arresting a pro-Western journalist and a pro-Russian figure, the authorities are attempting to prove to voters their “sovereignty” and equal distance from all external forces.
It is obvious that prosecution under espionage charges in Georgia traditionally intensifies during acute political crises, leading to identical outcomes: the case is immediately classified as secret, depriving the public of the opportunity to examine the evidence. The proceedings take place behind closed doors, and defence lawyers are bound by non-disclosure agreements. The primary targets are individuals with cross-border connections — heads of NGOs and projects funded from abroad.
According to official statements from the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG), Chikhladze is not accused of personally stealing secret documents from ministries. According to the investigation’s version, he “coordinated a network of several individuals and managed their activities.” Under the logic of the Georgian security services, the organiser of an agent network does not necessarily need access to classified databases himself. His task is to use his broad professional contacts in the expert, journalistic, and non-governmental sectors to aggregate information from other people who theoretically could have such access.
https://www.apsny.ge/2026/mil/1780151618.php
Wording of Article 314 of the Criminal Code of Georgia in Light of International Law.
The wording of Article 314 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (specifically its clause on the collection of “other information” to the detriment of state interests) directly contradicts key international treaties, conventions, and human rights standards to which Georgia is a signatory.
International institutions and legal norms classify such vague articles as tools of pressure across the following dimensions:
- Violation of Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Press.
This is the main contradiction. The article criminalises the collection of open data, which is a direct duty of any independent journalist or analyst.
At the same time, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) guarantees the right to receive and impart information freely without interference by public authority (IFEX). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has repeatedly emphasised that journalists have the right to gather information on matters of public interest. The introduction of criminal liability for collecting open, non-secret data is recognised as a gross violation of the right to freedom of expression.
Furthermore, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) establishes the right of every individual to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers. The vague term “other information” allows the state to arbitrarily punish individuals for legitimate professional activity.
- Violation of the Principle of Legal Certainty.
This is a fundamental standard of international justice, codified in Article 7 of the ECHR (“No punishment without law”). According to ECtHR jurisprudence, any law, especially a criminal one, must be:
- clear and predictable. A citizen must be able to understand precisely from the wording of the article what specific act constitutes an offence;
- accessible and understandable. The term “other information” lacks clear legal boundaries. A journalist conducting an interview or analyzing an open security agency budget cannot foresee whether the investigation will deem their analytics a “detriment to state interests”. This creates conditions for selective justice.
- Violation of Council of Europe and Venice Commission Standards.
The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, of which Georgia is a member, explicitly indicates in its opinions on similar laws across Eastern Europe that national security and espionage legislation must apply strictly to state secrets classified by law. The use of criminal charges for espionage against the civil sector and NGOs receiving foreign grants is recognised as a disproportionate state intervention. It creates a so-called “chilling effect”, leading journalists and activists to practice self-censorship out of fear of imprisonment.
- Violation of the Johannesburg Principles on National Security.
This is an authoritative international framework developed by the UN and human rights defenders to strike a balance between state security and freedom of expression. Principle 11 (Access to Information) states that no one may be punished on national security grounds for gathering or disseminating information unless doing so causes real, immediate, and irreparable harm to the protection of the state.
The collection of data on corruption, human rights violations, or political processes — precisely what Irakli Chikhladze was engaged in — is protected under these principles and cannot be qualified as espionage.
Protection of Journalists’ Rights and International Instruments of Pressure.
In international practice, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the UN Human Rights Committee have established rigorous standards for the protection of journalists. They have repeatedly overturned convictions based on vague “espionage” articles where states attempted to suppress freedom of expression under the guise of protecting national security.
Since Georgia is a member of the Council of Europe (CoE), systematic violations of the European Convention and disregard for the standards of legal certainty carry serious international legal and political consequences.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has the authority to launch or intensify a special monitoring procedure regarding Georgia. Within this mechanism, rapporteurs are appointed, and strict demands are issued to the country to amend its criminal legislation (specifically, to repeal or revise the wording of Article 314 of the Criminal Code).
The Council of Europe, in coordination with European Union (EU) institutions, links the allocation of macro-financial assistance and the implementation of joint programs directly to compliance with the Rule of Law. The deployment of espionage statutes against the civil sector leads to a complete freeze of European funding designated for Georgia’s infrastructure and public sector support.
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe holds the authority to issue formal warnings to the Georgian government. In extreme scenarios—as seen previously with other member states facing systemic refusal to enforce ECtHR judgments—a procedure to suspend the state’s membership in the Council of Europe is triggered, signifying a total loss of European political legitimacy for the ruling authorities.
We have resolved to submit documentation regarding the prosecution of Irakli Chikhladze to all the aforementioned international bodies.
Blow to Reputation.
A unique and contradictory situation has emerged in media coverage of Irakli Chikhladze’s case. Official Georgian authorities classified the details of the case, causing three distinct versions to appear in the press regarding which country he is accused of spying for.
The official position rests on the fact that the country has not been named. Georgian state and legal media have not disclosed this information. In its official press releases, the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) does not name a specific state. The SSSG’s statements contain only the vague wording of a “representative of a foreign intelligence service” and the transfer of data to “one of the European states.”
https://www.specialeurasia.com/2026/06/23/georgia-four-espionage-arrests/
The main spokesperson on this topic representing the country’s political leadership was Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the parliamentary majority, Mamuka Mdinaradze.
Shortly before Chikhladze’s arrest, in May 2026, Mdinaradze issued a stern public warning to foreign intelligence services, including allied Western nations, demanding an immediate halt to and winding down of their espionage activities on Georgian territory. Otherwise, he threatened to expose the identities of their agents.
Later, commenting on the arrest of Irakli Chikhladze, Mamuka Mdinaradze directly linked his case to that of the previously detained former official, Giorgi Udzilauri, whom pro-government media had openly associated with a European country. Mdinaradze publicly confirmed that the same state figure in Chikhladze’s case, which observers and experts unambiguously interpreted as an allusion to France.
https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c5y7nz2xq82o
The main sources linking the new detentions to the case of Giorgi Udzilauri are publications by OC Media and Novaya Gazeta, which covered the statements of Mamuka Mdinaradze. Further details are also provided in reports by the Newsgeorgia portal and the Public Broadcaster of Georgia (1TV). For detailed information, visit OC Media.
https://oc-media.org/ivanishvilis-detained-ex-associate-udzilauri-condemns-georgian-dream-leadership
https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/06/10/shpionazh-v-assortimente
The defense, represented by lawyer Giorgi Gelkhauri in interviews with Sova News and Georgia Today, stated that the lawyer had signed a non-disclosure agreement. He emphasized that he had no right to publicly name the country involved in the charges, but called the case itself “absurd.” At the same time, Gelkhauri stressed the absence of any connection between Chikhladze’s case and that of Gulbaat Rtskhiladze, who was detained on the same day under similar charges and, accordingly, a pro-Russian vector.
https://sovanews.tv/en/2026/05/31/irakli-chikhladzes-lawyer-i-have-never-seen-such-absurdity
A number of reputable international and independent Georgian media outlets link Chikhladze’s arrest specifically to French intelligence (DGSE):
https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c5y7nz2xq82o
The French publication Intelligence Online, in particular, published an investigation according to which France’s General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) found itself at the center of a espionage scandal in Tbilisi. According to the publication, against the backdrop of the arrests, including that of Chikhladze, France was forced to urgently recall its intelligence officers from Tbilisi at the request of the Georgian side.
https://www.specialeurasia.com/2026/06/23/georgia-four-espionage-arrests/
However, several Russian media outlets, followed unexpectedly by the Jamestown Foundation analytical center (USA) in its analysis, also indicated that the SSSG had detained the head of the Eurasian Institute, Rtskhiladze, and the founder of the Caucasian Listening Center, Chikhladze, on charges of espionage for Russia—likely erroneously conflating Chikhladze’s case with that of his pro-Russian “partner in misfortune,” Rtskhiladze, without cross-checking the information beforehand.
https://jamestown.org/georgian-dream-uses-espionage-cases-to-project-neutrality
At the same time, according to estimates by independent analysts at the Jamestown Foundation, Georgian agencies deliberately employ a tactic of “anonymous accusations” in official documents while simultaneously organizing controlled leaks through pro-government television channels, particularly Imedi. On one hand, this allows Tbilisi to avoid a direct and severe diplomatic scandal face-to-face with Paris. On the other hand, it gives the ruling party the opportunity to leverage the “surrounded by enemies and spies” narrative for the domestic Georgian electorate against the backdrop of the criminalization of Western foundations.
https://jamestown.org/tbilisis-counterintelligence-drive-strains-western-ties
We appeal to the media and analysts with a request to be exceptionally careful regarding the reputation of those about whom they write. If false mentions of Irakli Chikhladze alongside Rtskhiladze—a fighter against “Russophobia” and creator of the Georgian analogue of the “Immortal Regiment”—on the part of Russian media could be the result of either low professionalism or an intentional attempt at discredit (which is essentially understandable and not worth attention), we ask the Jamestown Foundation, as an authoritative and competent organization, to review this spontaneous and unfortunate error in presenting information concerning Irakli Chikhladze.
Under the classified nature of Chikhladze’s case, along with the a priori absence of objective possibilities for journalists and analysts to access this information, this remains merely an abstract version; nevertheless, it could deal an irreparable blow to the reputation of an innocent person, creating a negative backlash.
Many of Chikhladze’s colleagues are convinced that a Russian connection, on the contrary, lies at the very heart of Irakli Chikhladze’s arrest.
Recall that Irakli Chikhladze’s project, the website of the Georgian Russian-language publication newcaucasus.com, was blocked in Russia in January 2024. The site was added to the registry of prohibited websites by Roskomnadzor following a demand from the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation. The agency stated that the publication contained materials aimed at “destabilizing the socio-political situation in the Russian Federation.” The block was executed in a manner that restricted access to the entire website.
https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/32781990.html
Furthermore, critically important retrospectives must be taken into account. Irakli’s brother, Giga Chikhladze, was also a well-known journalist and correspondent. He was killed in August 2008 near Tskhinvali during the Russo-Georgian War while carrying out his professional duties. According to available data, the vehicle carrying Giga Chikhladze alongside his colleague Alexander Klimchuk came under fire from Russian forces. He was 30 years old at the time of his death. This fact is being actively discussed in Georgia in the context of Irakli Chikhladze’s current arrest.
Family friends, human rights defenders, and colleagues emphasize that the Chikhladze family is deeply patriotic, and Irakli’s brother gave his life for his country—making the allegations of espionage and treason against Irakli himself a source of particular public outrage and disbelief.
https://jam-news.net/suspects-arrested-in-georgia-deny-espionage-charges/
https://www.facebook.com/afqan.muxtarli.9/photos/1423861745953177
The error in covering hypotheses regarding Irakli Chikhladze’s alleged involvement in espionage on behalf of the aggressor state in this context strikes not only at his reputation, but also at the honor and memory of his family.
Conclusion. In light of the above, we, as human rights defenders, activists, and organizations fighting for media freedom and human rights compliance, appeal to the Georgian authorities—specifically the Ministry of Justice of Georgia, the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG), and the Prosecutor General’s Office of Georgia—in connection with the arbitrary detention of journalist and analyst Irakli Chikhladze under Article 314 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (“Espionage”).
We, representatives of the human rights community, demand that the Georgian authorities immediately fulfill the following points:
1. Immediate Release and Termination of Prosecution.
Drop all unfounded espionage charges against Irakli Chikhladze, as his prosecution clearly constitutes the criminalization of legitimate cross-border journalistic and peacebuilding activities. Release the journalist from custody immediately. In the absence of compelling evidence that he poses a flight risk, holding a prominent media figure in a pre-trial detention facility violates the principle of proportionality (Article 5 of the ECHR).
2. Declassification of Case Materials and Ensuring Transparency.
Remove the “top secret” classification from the criminal case materials. Total secrecy surrounding the judicial process deprives the public of the ability to monitor the actions of law enforcement agencies and prevents the defense from effectively refuting the charges.
Allow independent international observers, human rights defenders, and representatives of the Office of the Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia to attend all court hearings in this case.
3. Ensuring the Right to Defense and a Fair Trial.
Cease pressure on defense counsel. Investigative authorities must end the practice of binding lawyers with blanket non-disclosure agreements, which leaves the public exposed exclusively to a one-sided (state) narrative of events.
4. Disclosing the Nature of the Alleged Damage.
The state is obligated to clearly specify which exact classified information was compromised, rather than relying on the vague notion of “other information.”
5. Reform of Article 314 of the Criminal Code.
Initiate a review of the phrasing of Article 314 of the Criminal Code of Georgia. The current provision regarding the collection of “other information” contradicts the international standard of legal certainty (Article 7 of the ECHR).
Bring the law into line with obligations to the Council of Europe by clearly establishing that espionage charges may apply exclusively to officially classified state secrets. This will prevent the article from being used to prosecute analysts and journalists
6. Cessation of the Campaign Against Civil Society.
Halt the state stigmatization of independent media, non-governmental organizations, and the international foundations supporting them (USAID, NED, EED, etc.).
Repeal the repressive amendments to the Law on Grants and the legislation on “foreign influence” adopted in 2024–2026, which equate legitimate international cooperation with subversive activity against national security.
We also urge the international community to pay immediate attention to the case of Irakli Chikhladze, as even at the stage of the preliminary court hearing, we have likely witnessed potential violations of several articles of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms at once. In particular, Article 5, Paragraph 1(c) of the European Convention requires that detention be based on a “reasonable suspicion.” This means that the authorities must possess concrete facts or information capable of convincing an objective observer that the person may have committed a crime. If the authorities are unable to present specific facts indicating the collection of information constituting state secrets (or other information covered by the elements of the offense in question), relying instead solely on activities involving publicly available information, this may indicate a lack of “reasonable suspicion” under Article 5, Paragraph 1(c).
If the criminal prosecution of a journalist is not supported by convincing factual grounds and is used disproportionately, the ECHR may find that the interference violates Article 10 of the Convention. In its case law, the Court also takes into account that unfounded criminal prosecution of journalists is capable of creating a so-called “chilling effect,” deterring not only the specific author but also other media representatives from covering matters of public interest.
Article 18, in conjunction with Article 5, prohibits applying the restrictions on liberty permitted under the Convention for purposes other than those for which they were prescribed. If detention is used not to serve the objectives of criminal proceedings, but pursues an ulterior motive—such as exerting pressure on the applicant, obstructing their professional activities, or otherwise improperly influencing them—this may constitute a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5. While the absence of convincing factual grounds for arrest can serve as one of the circumstances supporting such a conclusion, it is not in itself sufficient to establish a violation of Article 18.
Therefore, we ask the international human rights community to pay close attention to the case of Irakli Chikhladze and to demand maximum transparency from Georgian investigative authorities regarding the case, including the public disclosure of evidence and proof. Equally, we demand the release of Irakli Chikhladze pending investigation, as he possesses no capacity to influence the course of the proceedings while at liberty.